Regulation of the German Capital Markets--Present Situation, Problems and Outlook by Schwark, Eberhard
Journal of Comparative Corporate Law and Securities Regulation 1 (1978) 299-318
D North-Holland Publishing Company
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1. Introduction
The legal structure of a national capital market may be based on various prin-
ciples. The connecting factor of the substantive rules may be the market institu-
tions as such and, through a law on economic supervision, may provide for certain
requirements to be fulfilled by the person acting in the market and with respect to
the securities offered in the market; they may also provide for rules governing the
course of the market. From a somewhat different perspective, the rules may origi-
nate in company law and may regulate the rights of shareholders, bondholders and
the public interested in the acquisition of stock and bonds in a manner correspond-
ing to the needs of the capital market. Finally, a legal system may to a large extent
do without legislation by the state and leave it to the institutions operating in the
capital market to develop market order by self-regulating rules established by the
institutions themselves, protecting the interests even of those finding themselves on
opposite sides of the market.
A first glance at the German capital market gives a diffuse and confusing impres-
sion. German law has a detailed, uniform company law; it contains market-related
rules in the form of statutes and, in addition, a number of conceptions that must
be regarded as belonging to the self-regulation of the economy. The present state
is the result of a development beginning at about the end of the 19th century. By
successive steps company law evolved in the direction of increased disclosure by
companies and improved protection of shareholders, subjected institutional
investors and market institutions to legal rules and state supervision and forced
the institutions operating in this sector of the economy to take measures by them-
selves that must be regarded as parts of a valid capital market law. However, this
legal development, which has not been analyzed scientifically in its entirety, has not
led to a uniform picture of the law on the capital market in the Federal Republic
of Germany. Sometimes civil law, company law, capital-market-related law and self-
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regulatory rules apply all at the same time. It is said that company law does not
take enough account of the needs of the capital market. It is also said that the capi-
tal market related rules do not sufficiently relate to the order and inner structure
of the issuing companies. Finally, it is said by some that the body of law applicable
to the market and its participants is ineffective. In Part 3 of this paper this criticism
will be dealt with briefly.
The lack of uniformity in German capital market law is more apparent if one
realizes that there is a fragmentation of the organs of control. Whereas a partial
supervision of the issuing institutions' duties under company law is a matter for the
judge keeping the register, the Federal Minister of Finance decides on the approval
of the issue of bonds. Institutional investors (such as banks, investment companies,
life insurance companies, and building and loan associations) are supervised by vari-
ous authorities of the Federal Government and, in addition, in certain fields even
partially by state (Ldnder) authorities. Certain types of investment are subject to
supervision merely under industrial law (Gewerberecht) by decentralized offices.
Supervision of the eight stock exchanges existing in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many (Frankfurt, Dusseldorf, Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, Hanover, Stuttgart,
Bremen) is a matter for the Ldnder.
2. Present situation
We shall try to introduce a certain order into this impression of confusion by
describing in three sections the rules for the forms of investment, the markets and
the self-regulation of the economy.
A. Provisions on different types of securities
(i) Shares of stock corporations
There is no general governmental supervision of the stock market in the Federal
Republic of Germany. Shares may be offered and sold publicly, and no publication
of any business data at the time of the issue or any administrative approval is
required. Only if trading in stocks is to be effected through an "official" market
institution (the stock exchange) do the detailed control provisions of the stock
exchange law apply (ef. B(i), below). Even the stock corporations themselves,
which in the German view are companies open to the public, have not been subject
to administrative restrictions since the abolition of the concessional system that was
in force until 1870. The legislature thought that by enacting mandatory provisions
of corporate law instead, the relation of the company to its shareholders and credi-
tors and the organization of the company could be sufficiently provided for. Some
rudimentary functions of supervision are exercised by the courts of registration.
The Stock Corporation Act, most recently fundamentally amended in 1965,
contains the following provisions which are material to a consideration of the legal
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aspects of the capital market and can here only briefly be referred to. It first
requires the incorporators of a stock corporation to make a report on the circum-
stances of its formation. If members of the managing board or of the supervisory
board are involved in the process of formation or if the company accepts the contri-
bution of assets other than money for the acquisition of shares, this formation
report must be examined by court-appointed auditors (Secs. 33, 34 of the Stock
Corporation Act). The formation report and the audit report must be submitted to
the Commercial Register which is open to inspection by the public (Sec. 9, para. I
of the Commerical Code). The examination and disclosure of the formation report
were essentially provided for as early as the 1884 amendment. Their obvious pur-
pose is the protection of the capital market from fraudulent formation of corpora-
tions. The publicity of the register is accompanied by the register court's power of
examination for obvious violations of the law and disproportionate valuations of
assets other than money to be contributed to the corporation (Sec. 38 of the Stock
Corporation Act). This does not mean, however, that the court has the duty to
enter into a detailed substantive examination of the matter. Rather, it is to pursue
doubts it may have whilst taking into account that there is considerable latitude in
the valuation of contributions other than money [1]. The legal provisions on the
formation of a corporation consequently do not prescribe any detailed material
examination of the corporation in the interests of the capital market.
Nor does the German Stock Corporation Act provide for current supervision of
corporations by administrative authorities or the courts during the life of the cor-
poration. The most important instruments of control are, rather, the legally
required annual publication of the balance sheet, the profit and loss statement, and
the business report (Sec. 177 of the Stock Corporation Act) as well as certain provi-
sions protecting the rights of minority shareholders.
Rules mandating the form of accounts (as well as valuation standards) apply to
the annual statements of corporations which, according to the intentions of the
1965 legislature, were to give effect to the principle of "transparent pockets", i.e.
were to give the public a complete insight into the financial and earning position
of the enterprise. Whether this legislative aim has been realized is disputed by
learned writers [2]. Because of the latitude in valuation alternatives and the non-
disclosure of profits subject to taxation, there is much to say for the opinion that
the profits listed might sometimes be at great variance with the profits actually
made. In addition, in Germany, as opposed to Anglo-Saxon countries, there is a
tendency to try to present a continuous balance sheet picture by concealing partic-
ularly high profits or losses by the accumulation or dissolution of hidden reserves.
The annual balance sheet of a stock corporation is examined by a certified
public accountant who certifies its correctness (Secs. 166, 167 of the Stock Cor-
poration Act). His examination is primarily to determine whether the bookkeeping
is proper and the statements in the business report are correct. The actual correct-
ness of statements, however, is tested by the certified public accountant only by
sample checks [3]. The annual financial statements have to be filed with the court
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of registration and published in the publications designated in the corporation's
articles.
The most important rights of control to which a public investor is entitled are
his rights to sue for the avoidance of resolutions passed at shareholders' meetings
in violation of the law or the articles of incorporation or on account of refusal by
the corporation to give information, and the right to demand the appointment of
special auditors for the review of the annual balance sheet or the business report
(Sec. 258 of the Stock Corporation Act) [4]. For the protection of minority share-
holders in controlled enterprises German company law contains detailed provisions
on "groups of enterprises" (Konzernrecht). If an enterprise controls a stock cor-
poration by reason of a "control agreement" or an "agreement to transfer profits",
the so-called outside shareholders are, at the time of the conclusion of the agree-
ment, entitled in accordance with Sec. 305 of the Stock Corporation Act to
demand an indemnity (Abfindungsanspruch) in the form of shares in the control-
ling company or in cash [5]. If they want to remain in the corporation, they must
be paid an adequate annual compensation (Ausgleichsanspruch) which must be
equal to at least the prospective earnings of the controlled enterprise at the time of
the control agreement. In the case of de facto control of another enterprise the
controlling enterprise must pay compensation if any disadvantageous measures of
influence have been taken (Sec. 311 of the Stock Corporation Act).
(i) Bonds
In contrast to the issuance of shares, bearer bonds and negotiable bonds drawn
up in the Federal Republic of Germany may be marketed only with official approv-
al. The legal bases for such approval are Secs. 795,808 (a) of the Civil Code and the
Act on Official Approval of Bearer Bonds and Negotiable Bonds of June 26, 1954
[6]. It is the purpose of the approval proceedings of the Federal Ministry of
Finance to examine whether payment of interest and principal appear to be suffi-
ciently ensured (from the standpoint of protection of the saver), whether the func-
tions of the capital market are preserved and whether dangers for the currency
might arise by an overflooding of the market with money-like securities [7]. It is
disputed how effective such proceedings are in furthering a policy in the face of the
influence of the situation in the capital market, especially the interest level [8]. The
declared purpose of the law to terminate direct government control of the capital
market during the post-war period is best realized by restricting the government's
power of interference to cases involving substantive disturbances that impair the
functioning of the capital market. Such disturbances, however, may be imminent
if approval of conditions not in conformity with the market are applied for or if the
number of applicants at any one time becomes excessively large. To get a picture of
the actual importance of the approval proceedings for bonds one must realize that
investment in bonds exceeds investment in shares many times over [9].
(iii) Certificates issued by investment companies
A distinction has to be made between certificates issued by domestic investment
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companies and those issued by foreign companies. The Act Concerning Capital
Investment Companies of April 16, 1957 (as amended) [101 contains provisions on
the organizational structure of German companies investing their property in securi-
ties or real estate as well as on their investment policy. Legal separation of the
assets of the investment company from the unit holders' securities collected in an
incorporated pool (investment trust) guarantees the safety of investors from the
time they acquire a share (of Sec. 6 of the Act) [11]. The investors do not become
corporate members of the investment company. Moreover, there is a segregation of
the unit holders' securities by the mandatory administration of these particular
securities by a custodian bank.
In contrast with the stock corporation law, the Investment Company Law does
not provide investors with a right to be heard, or for rights of control, with respect
to the company's business policy [12]. But the law contains detailed provisions on
the investment companies' investment policy, serving to minimize the risk to
investors. Investment funds may acquire only securities admitted to official trade
and quotation at the stock exchanges (Sec. 8 of the Act); only up to 5 per cent of
the shares of any one issuer may be accepted into the portfolio; and securities of
any one issuer must not exceed 5 per cent of the net asset value of the investment
fund. Real estate investment funds may acquire vacant parcels of land only to a
limited extent; the value of a single piece of real property is to be determined by an
expert committee before acquisition and must not exceed a certain part of the
net asset value (principle of risk spreading) (Sees. 27, 28 of the Act). The manage-
ment of the investment company is supervised by the custodian bank (Sees. 12,
26 of the Act) as well as by the Federal Banking Supervisory Office (See. 2 of the
Act; Sec. 33 of the Banking Act).
The requirements for current disclosure by the company occupy a prominent
position in the law. At least semi-annually, accounts must be rendered, including
the state of the assets of the fund; they must be published in the Federal Gazette
(Sec. 25 of the Act). These published accounts make it easier for the investor to
decide whether he wants to avail himself of the right (which he always has - except
in the case of real property funds where there is a certain waiting period) to have
his share in the investment trust paid to him in cash against surrender of his share
certificate (Sec. I1, para. 2; Sec. 36 of the Act).
The Act Concerning the Distribution of Foreign Investment Shares of July 28,
1969 [13] does not transpose to foreign funds the protective provisions of sub-
stantive law provided by the Act Concerning Capital Investment Companies because
the legal systems are too different. The application of several rigid ideas of German
law would lead to a virtual prohibition of the distribution of foreign investment
shares in the German market: the assets of the investment company would have to
be strictly separated legally from the investors' securities and the administration of
the assets of the fund would have to be supervised by a custodian bank with well-
defmed rights and duties. The Act Concerning the Distribution of Foreign Invest-
ment Shares is, therefore, confined to providing for certain special requirements
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that must be met before the Federal Banking Supervisory Office will grant permis-
sion for the distribution of foreign shares.
These requirements concern principally the- administration of assets by the
foreign investment company (See. 2, item No. 2 of the Act) and the terms of the
contract between the investment fund and the investor (See. 2, item No. 4 of the
Act). Sec. 2, item No. 2 of the Act requires that the investor's assets be in the safe
keeping of a custodian bank or, in the case of real estate, be supervised by such a
bank, thus providing the investor with security in a way comparable to See. 12 of
the Act Concerning Capital Investment Companies. This means that in cases where
the assets of the company are not legally separated from the investors' securities
and where the custodian bank appears as trustee or mere depositary for the com-
pany, the custodian bank's comprehensive custody of both the investors' cash and
non-cash assets must be established in the contract with the bank. Other legal pro-
visions applicable to the custodian bank need not correspond to those enumerated
in Sec. 12 of the Act Concerning Capital Investment Companies, but by the func-
tions of the foreign custodian bank and by other measures the investor must be
safeguarded at a level corresponding to domestic law [14].
The Act also places great weight on regulation of marketing and disclosure by
the foreign investment company. The company must have a paying agent and a
representative in the Federal Republic of Germany and persons interested in the
purchase of shares must be given a sales prospectus the contents of which are legally
prescribed (See. 3 of the Act Concerning the Distribution of Foreign Investment
Shares). The company must issue an accounting report at least semi-annually
(See. 4 of the Act) and announce the prices of issue and redemption daily (Sec. 4,
para. 1, item No. 3 of the Act). The observance of these duties of disclosure is
supervised by the Federal Banking Supervisory Office.
Both investment acts, particularly the Act Concerning the Distribution of
Foreign Investment Shares, mark a stage in legal development where the company
law regulations of the issuing enterprise recede and market-related measures com-
bined with official supervision assume greater importance.
B. Regulation of markets, persons and institutions having market functions
(i) "Official" trade on stock exchanges (listed securities)
"Official" trade in securities (i.e., trade in listed securities) on German Stock Ex-
changes is governed by the Stock Exchange Act, which has repeatedly been
amended, the latest amendment dating from April 28, 1975 [15]. It contains pro-
visions for the organization of the stock exchange, the licensing of persons admitted
to the stock exchange and the admission of securities and commodities to trade on
the stock exchange, the legal position of certain people participating in the market
(exchange specialists and floor traders), the settlement of exchange transactions
and, above all, future dealings. The stock exchanges of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many are established as institutions of "public law" administered by the bodies of
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the exchange themselves [16]. Quotations are fixed by public-appointed exchange
specialists in proceedings regulated by public law (Sec. 29, et seq. of the Stock Ex-
change Act). All activities at the stock exchange are subject to supervision by the
LJ'nder (Sec. 1, para. 2 of the Stock Exchange Act) and by a specially appointed
state commissioner (Sec. 2 of the Stock Exchange Act). The licensing of persons
admitted to the stock exchange by the board of governors (Sec. 7 of the Stock
Exchange Act) and the admission of securities and commodities to official quota-
tion on the stock exchange (Sec. 36, et seq. of the Stock Exchange Act) [17] have
been provided for in detail in the form of proceedings before an administrative
authority.
The introduction of securities to official stock exchange trade (i.e., listing) is
effected as follows: the admission of a sufficient number of securities suitable to be
dealt with on the stock exchange must be applied for by a bank. A detailed pro-
spectus, the contents of which are prescribed, must be attached to the application
[18]. The application is examined by the stock exchange's board of admission. The
board may demand additional information. The board's duties under Sec. 36,
para. 3 of the Stock Exchange Act are to insure that all relevant information is
furnished to the public by the prospectus and to prohibit the issue of securities that
may endanger important public interests or that may lead to significant disadvan-
tages for the purchasers. After the application has been granted and the stock
exchange prospectus published, the securities are introduced to trade on the
exchange.
This trade is effected between the banks and merchandisers admitted to the
stock exchange through the agency of exchange specialists and floor traders. The
"official" quotations are fixed, in the case of securities with a large turnover, by the
notification of every deal; in the case of securities without a large turnover, by the
computation of a uniform quotation at which the largest possible number of orders
may be carried out. The quotation can be effected only by the exchange specialists
or the board of governors. In the Federal Republic of Germany there is no compul-
sion to channel clients' orders through the stock exchange at officially quoted rates.
However, in their standard contract terms the banks have undertaken that they will
always submit clients' orders of officially quoted securities to the stock exchange,
in order to widen the market at the exchange and to enhance the guarantee that the
established quotations are correct.
(ii) Regulated and unregulated trade in unlisted securities
In addition to the official trade in listed securities on stock exchanges, there is
the unofficial regulated market both on and off the stock exchanges in securities
that are not admitted to official trade (unlisted securities). Although there is a con-
siderable market for these securities, their trade is not governed by the Stock Ex-
change Act. In this field there is, however, self-regulation of the market participants
(see C (iv), below). Another market covers so-called nonregulated unlisted trans-
actions, Le. trade off the stock exchange in securities not included in the unofficial
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regulated market. There is only a rudimentary examination of the quality of such
securities prior to their inclusion in the price list by dealers engaged in this trade
[19].
(iii) Institutional investors
The term "institutional investors", in its wider meaning in the Federal Republic
of Germany, is understood to mean all enterprises where long-term funds currently
accumulate and are available for investment in the capital market. Among these
investors are primarily the private insurance companies and the social insurance
institutions, but banking institutions, building and loan associations, and invest-
ment companies are also included.
The business activities of the investment-oriented insurance companies, i.e.
mainly the life insurance companies, are made subject to the supervision of the
Federal Insurance Supervisory Office by the Act Concerning Supervision of Insur-
ance Companies. This authority approves the business plans of the enterprises and,
in case the potential claims of the insureds are imperiled, intervenes to prevent
losses and failures (Secs. 80, 81(a) of the Act Concerning Supervision of Insurance
Companies). The investment policy of the insurance companies is regulated by pro-
visions on the investment of liquid assets, whiich are intended to limit and spread
the risk as well as to regulate the profitableness of the investment (See. 54(a)-(d)
of the Act Concerning Supervision of Insurance Companies). The strict investment
provisions in force at an earlier date have been relaxed by the 1974 amendment
[20], which gradually widened the room for investment. The life insurance com-
panies are also required to provide current disclosure corresponding to that of the
Act Concerning Joint Stock Companies [21].
The social security institutions of laborers and employees (which, on account of
the advanced social security system of the Federal Republic of Germany, accumu-
late considerable amounts of money) need to use the bulk of their assets to satisfy
current obligations of the pension system. In the capital market they merely invest
reserves of liquidity as well as any surpluses that may have accrued [22] and to this
extent are subject to statutory investment regulations. As bodies corporate under
public law they are, moreover, subject to current supervision by governmental
authorities.
Since the time of the Weimar Republic, credit institutions, whether under pri-
vate or public law [23], have been subject to governmental supervision under the
Banking Act. This Act has been repeatedly amended and, after the failure of the
Herstatt bank, made stricter [24]. It is the purpose of the Act to make provision
against abuses which are apt to endanger the safety of assets entrusted to credit
institutions (Sec. 6, para. 2 of the Banking Act) thereby impairing the functions of
an economic sector regarded as vital to the economy. Any banking transaction,
especially the receipt of deposits, requires a license by the authority, which will
especially examine the professional qualifications of the managers and the capital
basis of the enterprise. Through provisions on liable funds [25] and the liquidity of
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the institutions, which, inter alia, are the statutory framework for granting and
dispersal of loans, the soundness and solvency of the institutions are to be guaran-
teed (Sees. 10-12 of the Act).
It is noteworthy that the Act contains no requirement that a particular loan be
subject to governmental approval and no provision for governmental allocation of
loans to particular sectors of the economy; the Act provides only for general limi-
tations justifiable by principles of good banking practice. Nevertheless See. 23 of
the Act contains the possibility, presently not used, of governmental determination
of interest on loans and deposits and thus of governmental influence on essential
features in the operations of these institutions. Credit institutions are subject to a
duty of disclosure which is limited compared with the provisions of company law
(Sees. 26(a), 26(b) of the Act) but are subject to wide governmental rights to
demand information and to make investigations. Likewise, the 1976 amendment
increased the authority's powers to interfere in cases of serious danger to an institu-
tion; through the authority's exercise of these powers, bankruptcies of credit insti-
tutions may possibly be avoided in the future (See. 44, et seq. of the Act).
In addition to the provisions of the Banking Act, special provisions of govern-
mental supervision apply to the public-law credit institutions, which play a signifi-
cant part in the volume of banking business as a whole. Any bankruptcy of such an
institution is precluded by the guarantee of the public authority backing it.
In addition to the Banking Act, the Building and Loan Associations Act 1972
[261 furnishes special provisions for building and loan associations and the Mort-
gage Bank Act [27] for mortgage banks. They deal especially with the refinancing of
these banks and require that loans be made for set purposes. They deal also with
the relationship between customer and bank. Although the two last mentioned
groups of banks are special banks, German banking law in principle recognizes no
separation of the functions of deposit banks on the one side and of underwriters
and the brokerage business on the other. Rather, banking institutions may receive
a so-called full charter; the all-purpose bank is the predominant type in the Federal
Republic of Germany.
(iv) Supervision under industrial law (Sec. 34(c) of the industrial code)
As an answer to the increasing offer of "business shares" (interests in limited
partnerships and foreign issues) which are not subject to any detailed provisions
oriented to the capital market and are traded outside the organized capital market,
the German legislature, by enacting See. 34(c) of the Industrial Code [28], has sub-
jected persons who negotiate the purchase of such shares to an examination by the
industrial supervisory authorities. This examination extends to the personal trust-
worthiness and the financial circumstances of the traders, which must be unobjec-
tionable. In the interest of the protection of investors, traders are further required
to give information before making sales and are subjected to certain duties of con-
duct with respect to investors' assets. The attempt to use industrial police law to
secure the reliability of traders and thereby indirectly the quality of the investment
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may, however, be easily circumvented by the issuer or the promoter by distributing
the shares in its own name. Moreover, control by a sort of special police is hardly
an adequate way to safeguard the quality of an unorganized market.
C. Self-regulation of the industry
Self-regulation of conditions in the capital market by private business institu-
tions is not extensive in Germany. One reason may be that the enforcement of
public interests in Germany is traditionally effected by law enacted by the State.
Therefore, in many cases self-regulation appears as a preliminary step to statutory
provisions. On the other hand, legal [29] and public opinion regard the setting of
rules by economic associations as being insufficient to regulate effectively the inter-
ests of the general public or even of parties on opposite sides of the market. None-
theless, some institutions and procedures have recently been established that may
claim for themselves a regulative function in the capital market.
(i) Deposit guarantee .fiinds of the banking business
The three major groups of the German banking business (private banks, savings
banks, and credit co-operatives) maintain differently organized deposit guarantee
funds financed by their member institutions, the purpose of which is, in case of the
impending insolvency of a bank, to give help in the interests of depositors and, in
case of the bankruptcy of a bank, to compensate depositors for losses. Thus,
according to the statutes of the Fund of the private banks, non-banks are compen-
sated for losses of wage, salary, pension and sight-accounts up to an amount of 30
per cent of the liable capital of the credit institution in question. In the case of the
other groups of institutions the payments from each fund are not limited in
amount, but bankruptcy of such an institution has not occurred for a long time.
Membership in an organization designed to safeguard deposits is coupled with the
obligation of the institution to submit to a periodic internal audit by the appro-
priate bankers' association. Special risks in the business of a bank are thus sought to
be recognized at an early time. There is no question that such an audit will tend to
equalize conditions between banks and impair competition. For this and other
reasons [30] the voluntary safeguarding of deposits by the banking industry is dis-
puted as a legal matter.
(i) Directives governing insider transactions
Following the recommendations of the Exchange Expert Committee convoked
by the Federal Minister of Economics the head organizations of business have
advised potential insiders employed with listed companies and credit institutions to
submit voluntarily to the so-called insider directives and the rules for dealers and
advisers [31]. Under these rules the persons concerned pledge themselves by con-
tract to abstain from insider transactions and to look solely after their customers'
interests when making recommendations. The profits from insider transactions are
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to be paid over to the corporation whose securities have been the subject of the
transaction. Investigation of cases of insider trading is conducted by supervisory
panels set up at the stock exchanges. The directives governing insider transactions
and the rules for dealers and advisers have been accepted by the majority of poten-
tial insiders and by almost all credit institutions. Nevertheless, by the weight of
opinion in legal scientific literature, these rules have been criticized because of sub-
stantive loopholes and because the procedures are administered privately, within
the industry, rather than by judicial or other independent public bodies [32].
(ii) Take-over bids
Most recently the Exchange Expert Committee has published recommendations
concerning take-over bids [33]. According to these recommendations, a bid should
include any relevant information to be taken into account for its evaluation, in
particular elements that were of importance for the fixing of the take-over price.
The bid should provide for a reasonable time for review and should obligate the
purchaser, in case of a new and higher bid during a period of eighteen months, to
give equal treatment to all shareholders who intend to sell. New facts occurring
during the duration of the bid which may have unfavorable consequences for the
take-over price assessment should be disclosed by the purchaser. The offerer should
refrain, during the duration of the offer, from any transactions on his own account
involving shares of the company concerned.
The recommendations are not binding but are considered by the Commission as
a reflection of correct and responsible commercial conduct. In this way, they could
become at least partially binding rules by way of commercial practice (see Sec. 346
of the Commerical Code). As to the substance of the recommendations, the criticism
could be made that they reduce the period for adjusting former bids to eighteen
months, thus possibly counteracting prior practice under which the price commit-
ment was often applicable for a period of three to five years. Moreover, the obliga-
tion to adjust the price does not cover subsequent measures taken under the law on
enterprise groups (Konzernrecht) and their review by the courts. For example, if,
after the close of the take-over procedure, the purchaser and the other company
enter into an agreement to transfer profits or into a control agreement, and if the
settlement fixed therein for the minority shareholders is improved in court proceed-
ings (Sec. 306 of the Stock Corporation Act), the shareholders who sold their shares
under the take-over procedure are not entitled to equal treatment in terms of the
court decision.
(iv) Regulation of the unofficial market
Panels governing the unofficial market formed by the market participants decide
in proceedings patterned after the Stock Exchange Act whether a security is to be
included in unofficial trade. Trade is conducted in accordance with usages deter-
mined by a committee established by the Federal Association of German Banks.
The regulation of these unlisted transactions, which may be compared with the
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over-the-counter market, is therefore completely in the hands of the securities
business. However, this market does not have the safeguards provided by the law on
official trade. Publication of a prospectus is not compulsory; there is no statutory
liability for the correctness and completeness of a prospectus, nor is there any
fixing of prices by independent, government-supervised persons. In the case of the
unlisted transactions there is only an incompletely regulated market without any
genuine outside control.
(v) Voluntary disclosure
Finally, the rendition of semi-annual interim reports by the majority of com-
panies and the publication by the stock exchanges of the turnover of the most im-
portant securities traded on the exchanges are based on a voluntary arrangement.
Both measures are in accordance with the opinion that better information should
be provided to investors and to all those who are interested in the condition of the
capital market. As to the contents of the interim reports the stock exchanges have
worked out various schemes for different sectors of industry, providing for a mini-
mum of statements [34]. As in the case of all voluntary arrangements, they are not
enforceable; if violated, there is no legal sanction.
(vi) Central capital market committee
As early as 1957 the major issuing banks set up a committee to meet, usually
monthly, with representatives of the German Central Bank and the government to
discuss the situation of the bond market. Taking account of market conditions
recommendations are made on the order, the terms, and the timing of loan issues to
prevent any bunching of issues and consequent excessive strain on the market [35].
Although these recommendations are not binding they are generally followed by
the participants and are understood to be a substitute for state supervision of the
capital market. The Council of Economic Trends for the Public Authorities occu-
pies the same position in relation to the public sector as the Central Capital Market
Committee does to the private sector.
3. Problems
A. Company law versus regulation of the market
In the Federal Republic of Germany the law relating to the capital market flows
essentially from two sources: (1) provisions referring to the market process (in the
case of certain forms of trade in securities) and to the administration of the assets
of investors by certain enterprises and (2) the company law, which is largely the law
applicable to the organization of a community joined in a certain legal form. So far
both legal fields have been regarded much too separately and not sufficiently in
their functional interrelation [36]. When the Stock Corporation Act of 1965 was
enacted, it was recognized that one of the objects of the Act was regulation of the
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corporation's function of capital accumulation from a great number of investors for
the purpose of financing large enterprises [37], but when the Act was formulated
this function of capital accumulation was not taken sufficiently into account. When
a group of controlled enterprises is created by contract, it is true, outside share-
holders are granted compensation or indemnity, but company law does not regulate
the process of development of power by one corporation over another, for instance,
by take-over bids. So far the German company law contains no provisions to pro-
tect shareholders from insider transactions.
On the other side, the capital market law covers only a part of the field of the
capital market. Trade in shares in limited partnerships, which has considerably
increased in recent years, is supported neither by market regulations nor any
detailed provisions of company law. One of the aims of the capital market approach
that has been developing recently is to close the gap between company law and
capital market regulations and thus to create a uniform system with due regard to
the existing situation.
The existing legal situation outlined briefly in Part 2, above, reveals, however,
that the regulations relating to the capital market are increasingly realized by public
supervision of institutional investors (Act Concerning Capital Investment Com-
panies, Act Concerning the Distribution of Foreign Investment Shares, Insurance
Supervisory Act, Credit Institutions Act) and by organization of markets under
public law. Traditional company law, on the other hand, recedes into the back-
ground (if the further extension of the disclosure principle which is derived from
the company law is put to one side). The reason for this development may be that
the good order of the capital markets and their institutions is increasingly regarded
as a public responsibility in the interest of a great number of investors and the
smooth financing of the economy.
B. Protection of the individual versus safeguarding of functions
Seen from a scholarly viewpoint, the principal legal question relates to the direc-
tion which is to be taken by protective legislation. Some people emphasize the indi-
vidual protection of the investing public. Others stress the good functioning of
transactions on the capital market and the sound structure of the capital market
institutions, hoping to realize the protection of the investor at the same time. Advo-
cates of the first opinion prefer the enlargement of civil law precautions through
the development of company law; representatives of the second view incline
towards an economic legal system with governmental supervision. In my opinion,
this dispute, which has aspects not only of legal policy but also of fundamental
economic policy, should be solved on a pragmatic basis. Whoever favors legal pro-
visions serving the individual's protection, especially contractual claims and com-
pensation sanctions, will have to prove their effectiveness and, if necessary, will
have to accept supplementary provisions for the safeguarding of market functions
that require no individual activity. On the other side, it must be conceded to those
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 1978
E. Schwark / Regulation of the German capital markets
who place the safeguarding of market functions first that the protection of the
interests of investors can also be achieved thereby. This is so because a sound
system of investment enterprises with a capacity for competition improves the
investor's chances; a well-developed organized market guarantees the liquidity of
assets at any time and at fair prices. The dispute as to where the crucial points are
to be placed has not ended. Dealing with certain kinds of securities, the 1976 Con-
ference of German Jurists resolved on a proposal favoring the safeguarding of
market functions rather than, specifically, the protection of individual investors
[381.
C. Fragmentation of capital market authorities
The survey of German capital market law in Part 2, above, has revealed a frag-
mentation of supervisory authorities. German law knows neither central capital
market supervision nor supervision over all the phenomena relevant to the market.
Central agencies certainly involve the danger that a super-bureaucracy, remote from
the problems of reality, may be developed. It appears, however, that synchroniza-
tion and the sharing of experience among the various authorities suffer from the
present fragmentation and that some of the examinations prescribed by statute are
not actually being carried out. The partial legal regulations and the correspondingly
limited organs of control must, moreover, create a situation where the capital
market - which despite certain phenomena should be seen as interdependent and
uniform - is not viewed as a whole. As a result, from the point of view of the
investor, the security level of the investment varies; on the part of the offerer there
appear distortions of competition; on the part of the authority there is a tendency
to over-emphasize the requirements of the sector for which it is competent. It is
one of the tasks of jurisprudence to achieve more systematization and unification
of legal thought in the direction of a uniform capital market law. The extension
to the Federal Banking Supervisory Office to a central supervisory authority might
be a means to that end.
D. Loopholes in the capital market law
In the historical development of German capital market law some regulations
containing loopholes were knowingly tolerated; some were discovered only after
new factual develbpments. For instance, the Stock Exchange Act of 1896 did not
provide for concentration of trading in securities on the stock exchange; the legis-
lature assumed that, because of the safeguards provided for in the Stock Exchange
Act (isting procedure, prospectus, ascertainment of official market rate), the public
would naturally prefer to acquire securities quoted on the stock exchange. How-
ever, securities have been and still are also traded in Germany to a large extent out-
side the official market and even the unofficial regulated market; this is true espe-
cially of foreign shares and external loans. This gap in the system has recently led to
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substantial losses by German investors purchasing foreign securities. A further loop-
hole appeared recently when many partnership interests were sold by public offer
without sufficient disclosures about these investments to prospective buyers or
without investors being able to exercise an influence in their administration. The
development of this so-called grey capital market has only recently led to legal
scientific proposals for regulation and to the submission of a draft for a parliamen-
tary bill dealing with such investments (see Part 4, Section B, below).
E. Lack of effectiveness of the self-regulation of the business community
The forms of self-regulation of the business community mentioned in Part 2,
Section C, above, are increasingly subject to criticism [39]. Although it is a good
thing that industry makes up for recognized deficiency in regulation, there often
remain doubts whether these dispositions are correctly construed from a legal point
of view and whether the goals aspired to can be attained. Moreover, the conflicts
of interest usually inherent in such arrangements make the enforcement of effective
sanctions more difficult.
4. Outlook
A. Initiatives of the European Economic Community
As a result of the membership of the Federal Republic of Germany in the Euro-
pean Economic Community the development of German capital market law is
increasingly affected by the endeavors of the Commission of the Community to
harmonize and liberalize the investment sector. Although only a small part of the
work undertaken at the Community level has so far been successfully completed,
the fact that the Commission takes up a problem often causes the national legis-
lature to wait and see before enacting regulations of its own.
The basis of a uniformly organized and regulated capital market is the free flow
of capital within the Community as provided by Article 67 of the EEC Treaty.
After two directives concerning capital movement were issued in 1960 and 1962
[40], the process of further liberalization of capital movement came to a standstill;
a third directive concerning capital movement that was planned has not so far been
issued. However, the freedom of establishment of institutional investors in the
Community has meanwhile been evolved by the European Court of Justice as direct
law in force [41].
On the other hand the work of harmonizing substantive capital market law and
capital market supervision is continued in almost all fields. In the process, matters
are taken up for which German law so far has not made provision, such as interim
reports of issuers and prohibition of insider trading. The directives, a few of which
have already been issued [42], are concentrated on the law of stock corporations
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and the stock exchange law and on provisions regarding the supervision and invest-
ment policy of institutional investors. The intended extension of disclosure require-
ments under company law and stock exchange law and the emphasis laid by the
present drafts on the basic interrelation of the operations on the capital market are
noteworthy but cannot be dealt with in detail here. It may rightly be assumed that,
under the influence of Community initiatives, legal scholars will be forced into an
awareness of the interdependence of the regulations of capital market law in
Germany and will thereafter occupy themselves more with this field of law.
B. Bill on the investnenzt of capital
In response to a demand by the public and by legal scholars, the government has
recently submitted the draft of a statute subjecting essential parts of the unorgan-
ized capital market, especially the market for capital interests in limited partner-
ships, to a regulation of the marketing process [43]. The bill provides that issuers
shall submit a prospectus enclosing a scheme of accounts certified by auditors, and
that issuers offering their shares publicly to a large group of persons must register
with the Federal Banking Supervisory Office. The bill contains no provisions, how-
ever, for the merely embryonic secondary market.
The bill is of special importance for the development of capital market law
because for the first time legally different types of securities are dealt with, not
according to legal form, but from an overall market point of view. This clearly
expresses the aims of regulation by capital market law, i.e., that there shall be no
misappropriation of economically necessary capital by investment in business
undertakings that are unsuitable for the market and, secondly, that the investing
public shall be protected.
C. Committee to study the structure of credit institutions.
After the failure of the Herstatt Bank the Federal Minister of Finance set up a
committee charged with a critical examination of the German banking system and
the submission of proposals for the removal of faults. The terms of reference of the
committee include observations on the suitability of the universal bank system,
banks' participation in business corporations outside the banking business, the con-
duct of banks in securities transactions, and bank representation of clientsat coin-
panies' shareholders' meetings [44]. The report of the committee has recently been
published.
D. Development of company law towards a law of enterprises
It is important to point to a legal trend that increasingly leads to a change of the
conventional understanding of German company law. Especially because of the
recent introduction of co-determination of employees with management on the
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supervisory bodies of large enterprises, there is an emerging change in the notion
that company law deals primarily with the organization of the firm's management
as appointees of the providers of capital, the influence of shareholders in the com-
pany, and the rights of creditors of the company [45]. In a phrase, the enterprise
is called "a value adding organization built on plural interests"; when it is given a
legal order, special attention must be given not only to interests of capital and to
management functions but also to concerns of employees and to the public interest
in the functioning of the enterprise. Such a view would make it possible to include
in the legal considerations relevant to that enterprise even those processes taking
place on the capital market that concern persons who are not associated with the
company as shareholders. In this way, for instance, provisions for the protection of
persons acquiring securities from insiders, as well as the articulation of legal conse-
quences resulting from the formation of blocks of shares on the market by individ-
ual shareholders, may be included in the enterprise law. It is not impossible that in
the course of the development of an enterprise law matters which otherwise would
have been provided for by governmental interference and public supervision may be
covered by mandatory provisions of civil law.
E. Projections to have large groups of the population participate in the productive
propert, of the economy
Finally we shall briefly mention how our problem is affected by the legislative
platforms of the major political parties calling for a wide distribution of productive
property through the participation of large groups of the population [46]. The
intention to make practically the whole working population investors in the capital
market in one form or another by operation of law will certainly increase the need
for safeguarding investors. The fact that a vast number of persons will then appear
as investors alters the significance of important occurrences on the capital market:
they become quasi political events that affect everybody. The realization of plans
for the participation of large groups of the population in the productive property
of the economy will therefore tend to create an increase in capital market regula-
tion.
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